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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
WOULD A STATUTE PROVIDING FOR THE WAIVER OF
A JURY IN FELONY CASES BE CONSTITUTIONAL IN
MISSOURI?
BY ROBERT L. ARONSON
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right
to appear and defend, in person or by counsel; to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation; to meet the wit-
nesses against him face to face; to have process to compel
the attendance of witnesses in his behalf; and a speedy, pub-
lic trial by an impartial jury of the county.1
The right of trial by jury, as heretofore enjoyed, shall
remain inviolate; etc.2
These two sections of the Constitution of 1875 comprise the
sole restrictions in this state upon the power of the General As-
sembly to legislate concerning the status of the jury in criminal
procedure. Taking the words at their ordinary and obvious
meaning, there can be no doubt or hesitancy in saying that they
forbid the enactment of any statute denying to an accused the
right to be tried by a jury when he desires to be so tried. But
the statute suggested in the subject of this thesis would not go to
this extent, but rather would confer upon the accused the right
of choice, the option, between having the question of his guilt or
innocence determined by a jury of his peers and having it de-
cided by the judge presiding over the court. Certainly it can
not-be said of such a statute that it conflicts clearly and indubi-
tably with the existent constitutional provisions, unless these con-
stitutional provisions are given a stronger interpretation and a
greater significance than their bare language would seem to in-
dicate.
Before attempting to consider the precise question here in-
volved, it seems proper to examine the existing situation in Mis-
souri, in the absence of a statute authorizing waiver in felony
prosecutions. The constitutional provisions above quoted are
supplemented and reinforced by the statutory declaration that8
'Const. Mo., Art. II, See. 22.
'Const. Mo., Art. II, Sec. 28.
'R. S. Mo., 1919, Sec. 4005.
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"All issues of fact in any criminal cause shall be tried by a jury,
to be selected, summoned and returned in a manner prescribed
by law." However, this peremptory and mandatory require-
ment as to criminal procedure is made less stringent as to mis-
demeanor cases by the succeeding provision :4 "But the defend-
ant and prosecution attorney, with the consent of the court, may
submit the trial of misdemeanors to the court, whose findings
in all such offenses shall have the force and effect of the ver-
dict of a jury." Under this state of the constitutional and
statutory law the decisions have held that, while waiver in mis-
demeanor cases was invalid prior to the enactment of the stat-
ute,5 because of such statute the waiver of the right to trial by
jury is valid and effectual,6 the constitutionality of the statute
not being very seriously questioned; and as to felony cases it has
been uniformly held that the defendant has not the right to
waive jury trial.7 The cases involving felonies have not been in
entire agreement as to the reasons for this holding, and some of
the cases contain statements of a general nature which tend to
confuse the decision of this question if improperly interpreted.
It has been the general rule throughout the United States, in
the absence of an authorizing statute, that one accused of having
committed a felony and pleading not guilty to the charge cannot
waive trial by jury. The reasons for this rule have not been
harmonious from state to state, and it is now purposed to exam-
ine all the grounds upon which these decisions have been rested.
In the light of these cases, the holdings and statements in the
Missouri cases can perhaps be more accurately evaluated. If it
can be demonstrated in the course of the examination of these
decisions that none of the various reasons underlying them
would under Missouri constitutional provisions necessitate the
holding that a statute authorizing the substitution of judge for
jury as a fact-finding agency (for this is the practical effect of
'R. S. Mo., 1919, Sec. 4006.
Neales v. State, 10 Mo. 498; Cousineau v. State, 10 Mo. 501 (1847).
'State v. Moody, 24 Mo. 560 (1857) ; State v. Larger, 45 Mo. 510 (1870);
State v. Wiley, 82 Mo. A. 61 (1899) ; State v. Bockstruck, 136 Mo. 335, 38
S. W. 817 (1896) ; State v. Finley, 162 Mo. A. 134, 144 S. W. 120 (1912).
'State v. Mansfield, 41 Mo. 470 (1867); State v. Meyers, 68 Mo. 266
(1878); State v. Sanders, 243 S. W. 771 (1922), Mo. Sup. Div. 2; State v.
Talken, 292 S. W. 32 (1927), Mo. Div. 2.
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waiver) is unconstitutional, it follows that none of the decisions
of our courts, whatsoever their basis in reason may be, compel
by their dicta a holding of unconstitutionality.
Some cases have denied the right of waiver because of the
imperative or mandatory language of the constitutional provi-
sions governing these cases. Thus the federal constitution reads
as follows :" "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeach-
ment, shall be by jury." Accordingly it has been held that "the
constitutional provision is mandatory. It cannot be waived in
any case to which it is applicable." A few state constitutions
are also in terms peremptory in demanding the jury, and as a
consequence waiver is not permissible. ° But these cases are of
practically no value as authority in Missouri, for our organic
law differs radically from the mandatory language of these con-
stitutions.
It should be noted, somewhat parenthetically, that these re-
quirements of the federal constitution do not affect criminal pro-
cedure in Missouri, nor limit the state's rights to adjust such
matters itself. The Sixth Amendment, of course, does not re-
late to state action, but only imposes limitations upon the federal
government;1 and section 2 of article 3 of the federal consti-
tution also relates only to offenses against federal laws. 12 Re-
forms of procedure in trials for state offenses do not conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal constitution
either as abridging the privileges and immunities of citizens of
the United States's or as taking life, liberty, or property without
'Const. U. S., Art. III, Sec. 2, Par. 3; in addition to this clause, there is
in the Sixth Amendment language much like that in Const. Mo., Art. II,
Sec. 22, supra.
'Coates v. U. S., 290 Fed. 134 (1923); also, In re Virch, 5 Alaska 500
(1916) ; Queenan v. Territory, 11 Okla. 261, 71 Pac. 218 (1901) -affirmed,
190 U. S. 548, 47 L. Ed. 1175; Freeman v. U. S., 227 Fed. 732; Low v. U. S.,
169 Fed. 86; Dickinson v. U. S. 159 Fed. 801.
" State v. Stewart, 89 N. C. 563; State v. Holt, 90 N. C. 749, 47 Am. Rep.
544; State v. Pulliam, 184 N. C. 681, 114 S. E. 394 (1922); State v. Cttrill,
31 W. Va. 162, 6 S. E. 428 decision by an equally divided court.
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243.
Eilenbecker v. Dist. Ct., 134 U. S. 31, 33 L. Ed. 801; Cook v. U. S., 138
U. S. 157, 34 L. Ed. 906.
" Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 44 L. Ed. 597; Twining v. New Jersey,
211 U. S. 78.
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due process of law.14 A state is free to adopt any type of pro-
cedure it wishes. 15 In the case of Hatlinger v. Davis,1 6 it was
specifically held that a statute of New Jersey authorizing waiver
of trial by jury did not violate the Constitution of the United
States.
Another ground that is sometimes given as the basis of a de-
cision that jury trial cannot be waived is the fact that there
exists a mandatory statute requiring that the determination of
facts be by a jury.1 Such a statute now exists in this state as
regards felonies,18 and has so existed since before the earliest case
on the right to waive the jury in a felony prosecution arose ;19
therefore, it is believed that this statute alone has always been
sufficient to justify the decisions not allowing waiver. But dis-
regarding this possibility, it must be patent that such a statute
will no longer operate to render waiver invalid after the enact-
ment of another statute permitting waiver, since the former
statute making the jury trial mandatory must be repealed by the
subsequent one either expressly or by implication.
Closely related to this reason for not permitting the jury trial
to be waived by one accused of crime, is the theory that no
waiver or action by the defendant can give to the trial judge
power to decide the facts. Only the jury has this power, and
jurisdiction cannot be vested in a judge alone by the mere con-
sent of the defendant. This jurisdictional argument has been
thus stated by the Supreme Court of Nebraska :20 "If, then, the
only tribunal provided by the Constitution and laws of the state
of Nebraska for the trial of one charged with a felony is a court
and jury, it follows that the parties cannot by agreement consti-
tute some other tribunal for this purpose. Consent of parties
can waive jurisdiction of the person, but the law alone confers
Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516; Twining v. New Jersey, supra.
" Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22.
" 146 U. S. 314; 36 L. Ed. 986 (1892).
"Comm. v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 172, 153 N. E. 537 (1926) ; Jackson v.
Comm., 221 Ky. 823, 299 S. W. 983 (1927); In re McQuown, 19 Okla. 347,
91 Pac. 689, 11 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1136 (1907) ; State v. Battey, 32 R. 1. 475, 80
Atl. 10 (1911); Wartner v. State, 102 Ind. 51, 1, N. E. 65 (1885); Arnold
v. State 38 Nebr. 752, 57 N. W. 378 (1894).
Sec. 4005, supra.
"See Mo. Gen. St., (1865), Ch. 213, Sec. 1.
Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761, 101 N. W. 1007 (1904).
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jurisdiction of the subject-matter." And the leading case of
People v. Harris,21 expresses the doctrine in these words: "A
jury of 12 men being the only legally constituted tribunal for the
trial of an indictment for a felony, it necessarily follows that the
court or judge is not such tribunal, and that, in the absence of a
jury, he has by law no jurisdiction. There is no law which au-
thorizes him to sit as a substitute for a jury, and perform their
functions in such cases, and if he attempts to do so, his act must
be regarded as nugatory. * * * But it is said that the right
to a trial by a jury is a right which the defendant may waive.
This may be admitted, since every plea of guilty is, in legal ef-
fect, a waiver of the right to a trial by the legally constituted
tribunal. But while a defendant may waive his right to a jury
trial, he cannot by such waiver confer jurisdiction to try him up-
on a tribunal which has no such jurisdiction by law. Jurisdic-
tion of the subject-matter must always be derived from the law
and not from the consent of the parties."
As was seen to be the case above in connection with the man-
datory statutory provisions, this obstacle to valid and effective
waiver can also be removed by legislative enactment, and will be
overcome by a statute providing for waiver, since such a statute
would contain in addition to an authorization of the waiver of a
jury, the complementary provision empowering the court to de-
termine the facts, as is shown by the Missouri waiver statute for
misdemeanors, quoted above.22 Indeed the cases cited recognize
that the interposition of a statute giving the defendant power to
dispense with a jury trial will render this argument against per-
mitting waiver wholly nugatory.28 In Commonwealth ,v. Rowe2'
the statement is made that "the legislature, which imposed the
- 128 Ill. 585, 21 N. E. 563, 15 Am. St. R. 153 (1889) ; see, also, Note, 21
Cent. L. J. 1. c. 231; State v. Smith, 184 Wis. 664, 200 N. W. 638 (1924);
and all cases cited in footnote 17; as holding contra, see State ex rel. War-
ner v. Baer, 103 Oh. St. 585, 134 N. E. 786 (1921), which states: "The court
had full and complete jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the trial. The
provisions regarding jury trial refer only to the form and manner of the
trial, and are in no sense jurisdictional in character. If a person has a
right to jury trial, and is deprived of such right, it is an irregularity which
constitutes error but does not present a jurisdictional question."
=R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 4006.
"Cases footnote 21.
"257 Mass. 172, 153 N. E. 537 (1926).
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limitation (upon the judge's power), can remove it. In so do-
ing, it will be acting within its constitutional powers, as the
right of the accused to a jury trial will not be lessened."
The courts of a few states, notably Wisconsin,25 base their re-
fusal to sanction the waiver of a trial by jury to some extent up-
on the public policy of the state. For example, in the recent
Pennsylvania case of CommonweaZth v. Hall,2 8  hief Justice von
Moschzisker writes as follows: "Where we find a uniform prac-
tice, continuously pursued from the beginning of the common-
wealth, and recognized in our organic law, of trying indictable
offenses, on a plea of not guilty, before a judge and jury, does
this not establish the practice as a public policy of the state to
such an extent that the situation should be viewed as though the
law-making body had limited the legal capacity of the courts ac-
cordingly?"
This public policy theory is another ground for not allowing
waiver of jury trial which cannot stand after the passage of a
law authorizing such waiver. For, "generally speaking, the Leg-
islature is the body to declare the public policy of a state, and to
ordain changes therein. 2 7  Public policy is never contrary to an
express legislative enactment.2  One author expresses the prin-
ciple so: "In the last analysis, it is for the legislature to deter-
mine whether any jury or a jury of twelve is essential in every
case to safeguard the interests of the accused and to maintain
public confidence in the judicial system. ' 29  And perhaps the
finest and most lucid statement of the weakness of this theory in
the presence of a statute was made by the Supreme Court of Wis-
consin, the outstanding proponeiits of the theory in the absence
of statute, in the case of In re Staff, 80 as follows: "But when the
legislature says that he may have it (the right of waiver), and
" State v. Lockwood, 43 Wis. 403; Jennings v. State, 134 Wis. 307, 114
N. W. 492 (1908); Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249, 126 N. W. 737, 31 L. R. A.
(N. S.), 966 (1910) ; State v. Smith, 184 Wis. 664, 200 N. W. 638 (1924);
Michaelson v. Beemer, 72 Neb. 761, 101 N. W. 1007 (1904).
"140 Atl. 626 (1928).
Comm. v. Hall, spra; also, State v. Worden, 46 Conn. 349, 33 Am. Rep.
27 (1878); State v. Woodling, 53 Minn. 142, 54 N. W. 1068.
"Belt v. U. S., 4 App. D. C. 25 (1894).
"S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, "Waiver of Trial by Jury in Criminal
Cases," 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695, 1. c. 712.
"68 Wis. 285, 28 N. W. 587, 53 Am. R. 285 (1885).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss1/4
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thus establishes a different public policy, what constitutional
rule is violated? Public policy is to some extent a creation of
the legislature. The statutes embody much of the public policy
of the state, and that policy may be one thing today and the op-
posite tomorrow, as the legislature in its wisdom may enact. It
was the public policy of the state to deny to persons about to be
tried for crime the power effectually to waive a jury. It is now
its policy to permit such waiver in the municipal court for Rock
County, and in some other courts, and perhaps hereafter the
same policy may be extended to all trial courts in the state. We
cannot perceive wherein such legislation infringes the Consti-
tution."
Only one argument against the validity of a waiver authorized
by statutes remains to be considered-the argument that the
constitutional guarantee of the right of trial by jury establishes
an invariable principle of government and makes of the jury an
institution which inheres in the very nature of criminal proce-
dure. No argument short of this could effectively maintain the
proposition flowing therefrom, that the statute authorizing
waiver of the right to trial by jury is unconstitutional. This
proposition has, of course, much deeper significance than the
ordinary public policy argument last discussed. It does not sug-
gest the usual question which is presented to the courts in cases
of attempted waiver without statutory authorization, viz., did
the framers of the constitution intend the right of jury trial as
a personal privilege or security of the accused, or did they intend
it also as a protection to the state. Here the question rather is,
did the framers intend the right of trial by jury to be something
less than an indispensable feature of lawful criminal procedure,
or did they intend it to be such an absolutely necessary element
in the determination of guilt.
It is believed that the language of the Missouri Constitution
will not support the proposition here under consideration. The
expressions, 'the accused shall have the right to a trial by jury'
and 'the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate,' cannot,
under any ordinary construction of the words, be said to im-
peratively order trial by jury, nor to prescribe it as the exclusive
Washington University Open Scholarship
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mode of trial of all crimes.3 1 It guarantees the right when
claimed, but does not provide that it must be exercised. "This
language imports merely a grant or guaranty of a right to the
accused for his own protection, and seems * * * never to
have been intended to prescribe the organization or the court, or
to make the jury an essential part of it."''  These words merely
prevent the state from compelling a non-consenting individual
to trial without a jury; the constitutional language does not ex-
clude or deny the power of the legislature to provide for a mode
of trial, at the option of the accused, without the intervention of
a jury. The case of State v. Worden" is particularly instructive
in this connection. Under constitutional provisions practically
identical with the sections of the Missouri Constitution supra,
the legislature enacted a law authorizing waiver in all criminal
prosecutions. Defendant, convicted of a felony by the judge
trying the case alone after the jury was waived, appealed on the
ground that the statute violated the constitutional requirement
that "the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate."' 4 The
Supreme Court of Connecticut said: "No one by simply reading
this section would suppose that the framers of the Constitution
intended by it to secure a principle of government, or the polit-
ical rights of the people collectively or individually. The natural
and obvious meaning is to secure to suitors and persons accused
of crime, as individuals, the right and privilege of having their
causes heard and determined by a jury; and it is difficult to see
how the principles of liberty and self-government, or the inter-
ests of the body politic can in any way be put in jeopardy by a
waiver of that right." It was further held that the Constitu-
tion if intended to protect the general public, would have used
language so showing and would have acted directly, rather than
concealing such intent in a provision apparently intended to se-
cure personal individual rights. Moreover, "constitutional pro-
visions are very seldom self-executing."' 5
State v. White, 33 La. Ann. 1218 (1881) ; State v. Robinson, 43 La. Ann.
388, 8 So. 937 (1891).
' State v. Woodling, 53 Minn. 142, 54 N. W. 1068 (1893) ; State v. Shear-
er, 27 Ariz. 311, 232 Pac. 893 (1925).
" 46 Conn. 349, 33 Am. Rep. 27 (1878) ; followed in State v. Rankin, 102
Conn. 46, 127 Atl. 916 (1925).
Const. Conn., Sec. 21.
"State ex rel. Warner v. Baer, 103 Oh. St. 585, 134 N. E. 786 (1921).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol14/iss1/4
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Of course, in the several jurisdictions which hold the right
of trial by jury to be a mere personal privilege,6 the proposition
that the constitutional guarantee establishes an indispensable
element of criminal procedure clearly is not maintainable. And
even in the states which do not consider the right to be waiv-
able,1 whether because of mandatory statute, or state public
policy, it is believed that the proposition is unacceptable. It
seeks to read into the unambiguous language of the Constitution
a signification that is not present; it seeks to imply limitations
upon the legislative power that do not exist. Consequently
among all the jurisdictions having constitutions identical with or
similar to our organic law, there is not a single case holding that
a statute authorizing waiver is unconstitutional, but several
which hold that such statutes are consistent with the funda-
mental law.38 One court has said: "We have no difficulty what-
ever in holding that the public policy which stood in the way of
an effectual waiver is not so inherent in the form and frame-
work of our government as to place it beyond the reach of legis-
lative interference, but that it is the subject of legislative con-
trol.", 9
The distinction between the type of provisions concerning the
jury in the Missouri Constitution and the mandatory language
of the federal constitution and others of its type has been noted.
Despite the verbal difference, and the consequent basis for sup-
porting the proposition that jury trial is fundamental and unal-
terably necessary in criminal prosecutions under the imperative
type of constitutional provision, it is interesting to note that
even here it has not uniformly been held that a statute authoriz-
ing waiver is invalid. The case of In re Virch0 did so hold, but
it is opposed by two cases which greatly outweigh it in the cog-
"Comm. v. Rowe, 257 Mass. 172, 153 N. E. 537 (1926) ; State v. Stevens,
84 N. J. L. 561, 87 Atl. 118 (1913) ; People v. Harris, 302 JI1. 590, 135 N. E.
75 (1922) ; State ex rel. Warner v. Baer, supra.
The leading case here is Cancemi v. People, 18 N. Y. 128.
'Murphy v. State, 97 Ind. 579, 584; In re Staff, supra; cases in footnotes
32, 33, and 34. Cf. the unusual views of Stafe v. Stevens, supra, which un-
der a holding that jury trial can be waived in felony cases without statute
states that if defendant could not waive trial by jury, no legislation could
give him that power.
In re Staff, supra; approved in State v. Jenning, supra.
5 Alaska 500.
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ency of their reasoning.' In Belt v. U. S.,42 the court noted the
verbal difference between the peremptorily-phrased paragraph
in section 2 of article 3 and the unemphatic provision of the
Sixth Amendment, but held that the difference in wording meant
nothing, both clauses having the common object of serving pub-
lic policy by perpetuating the old system of trial. The statute
authorizing waiver was accordingly upheld. These views are
concurred in by the author quoted above who also believes that
the employment of mandatory language in article 3, section 2,
ought not to be held to change the nature of the right conferred
from a personal privilege to a right in which the public has an
interest, but should be construed merely as granting the right
more emphatically.4s
One fact which makes it difficult to hold the right of trial by
jury to be fundamental and not subject to legislative regulation
is that this right is usually granted in the same clause or para-
graph with other rights, all of which are held to be strictly per-
sonal privileges, and waivable without statutory authorization.
Thus Art. II, Sec. 22, of the Missouri Constitution, quoted supra,
confers several privileges upon the accused. If these are re-
garded as privileges and can be waived,44 why is the right to trial
by jury placed upon a different plane? 4 And even if it be con-
ceded that from public policy or on the jurisdictional argument,
jury trial cannot be waived, still there is no such difference be-
tween the two sections of the same granting clause that one is
above legislative alteration, while the other is subject thereto.
Another fallacy in the indispensable principle of government
theory lies in the fact that defendants are everywhere permitted
by pleas of guilty to waive jury trial and all trial.48  This prac-
a Belt v. U. S., 4 App. D. C. 25 (1894), affirmed as In re Belt, Petitioner,
159 U. S. 95, 40 L. Ed. 88; Ex parte Dunlap, 5 Alaska 521.
'See footnote 41.
S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, in 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695.
State v. Lynn, 169 Mo. 664, 70 S. W. 127 right to trial in county where
crime is alleged to have been committed; State v. Wagner, 78 Mo. 644, 47
Am. Rep. 131 confrontation of witnesses; State v. Throndson, 191 N. W.
628 (N. D.), right to have counsel and the procurement of witnesses.
'a In re Staff, supra; State ex rel. Warner v. Baer, supra; State v. Kauf-
man, 51 Iowa 578, 2 N. W. 275; 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695.
"Ex parte Dawson, 20 Idaho 178, 117 Pac. 696 (1911) ; State v. Thrond-
son, supra, Howington v. State, 235 Pac. 931 (Okla. Cr. Ct., 1925); In re
Staff, supra; State v. Harris, supra.
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tice shows that trial by jury under any interpretation of the con-
stitutions is not the sole method of determining guilt or inno-
cence. Courts do not refuse to entertain the plea of guilty, de-
spite the fact that logically it is a relinquishment of a trial by
jury. This exception to the main proposition is inconsistent
with it, and further demonstrates its untenability.
Thus far in this consideration of the right of waiver the at-
tempt has been made to demonstrate that under none of all the
various grounds upon which have been based the decisions deny-
ing the right to waive jury trial in the absence of a statute pro-
viding for waiver, would a statute making such provision be un-
constitutional, with the possible exception of cases where there
is a mandatory constitutional provision. If this shall have been
proved, ft follows as a necessary conclusion that in Missouri,
having the constitutional provisions that it has, a statute author-
izing waiver of the jury in felony prosecutions must be valid.
And it is believed that there is nothing in the Missouri cases on
the subject of waiver which would lead to a contrary conclusion.
The true basis of the Missouri cases, although the courts do not
expressly so state, appears to be the public policy theory. Thus
in State ,v. Mansfield, 47 the leading Missouri case, it was said that
public policy condemns a choice by an accused for "the prisoner
is not in a condition to exercise a free and independent choice
without often creating prejudice against him." This statement
was repeated in the recent case of State v. Taken .48  Every
statement in the cases, no matter how far-reaching, is reconcil-
able to and consistent with a desire on the part of the judges
merely to preserve what the public policy of the state then de-
manded. For instance, in State v. Sanders49 it is said that "the
right * * * is not one which the accused can waive, but
must be accorded to him to afford him such a trial as is contem-
plated by the Constitution." Considered abstractly this expres-
sion might seem to indicate the adoption of the view that deci-
sion by a jury is indispensable to trial as being a principle of
government. But its true significance is believed to be merely
a statement, in perhaps unnecessarily broad terms, that the Con-
, 41 Mo. 470 (1867).
292 S. W. 32 (1927) Mo. Sup. Div. 2.
"243 S. W. 771 (1922) Mo. Sup. Div. 2.
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stitution establishes an ordinary, not an unalterable, public pol-
icy; this public policy implied from the Constitution is not so
profound as to be beyond legislative reformation, but rather is
implied into existence in default of a legislative declaration on
the subject. In this connection little significance should be at-
tached to the fact that the authority chiefly relied upon in State
v. Mansfield was Cancemi v. People,50 the foundation-stone of the
doctrine of profound public interest in a strict adherence to a
policy of trial by jury.
The very strongest argument in favor of the constitutionality
of the proposed waiver statute for felony cases is the fact that a
similar statute relating to misdemeanors has been upheld by the
courts of this state,51 although before this statute it had been
held in Neales v. State 2 that there could be no waiver in misde-
meanor cases. The Constitution makes absolutely no distinction
in respect of waiver between felonies and misdemeanors, speak-
ing only of "criminal prosecutions." Such a distinction cannot
be extracted from the words "as heretofore enjoyed" merely by
reason of the fact that the statutes existing when the Constitu-
tion of 1875 was adopted, permitted waiver of jury in misde-
meanor cases and not in felony cases. It would be absurd to im-
port existing statutory law into the Constitution and raise it to
the dignity of organic law on the basis of these three words.
The true right "heretofore enjoyed," it would seem, was such
that both felony and misdemeanor waiver statutes might have
been constitutionally enacted, but only the latter actually had
been enacted. The cases from other states hold that felonies
and misdemeanors are on the same footing as regards the right
to waive jury trial, or the validity of a statute providing for such
waiver, because the constitutions make no distinction. 3 Nor
can a technical difference in profound, inherent public policy be
found between the two grades of crimes. "It surely cannot be
true that the public is interested in the protection of the accused
18 N. Y. 128.
Cases in footnote 6.
-10 Mo. 498 (1847).
State v. Tiedeman, 207 N. W. 153 (S. D., 1926) ; State v. Worden, supra;
State v. Woodling, supra; State v. Battey, supra; In re McQuown, supra,
quoting Clark on Criminal Procedure, p. 434.
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in proportion to the magnitude of his offending-that its solici-
tude goes out to the great offender but not to the small-that
there is a difference in point of sacredness between constitu-
tional rights when asserted by one charged with a grave crime
and when asserted by one charged with a lesser one." '
There remains but one additional argument to complete the
demonstration of the constitutionality of a statute providing for
the waiver of a jury in felony cases in Missouri. It must be ap-
parent to all that he who voluntarily relinquishes a right is not
deprived of it. Under a constitution guaranteeing that an ac-
cused shall have the right to a jury trial, or that the right shall
remain inviolate, "it seems manifest that the state does not vio-
late the right when it offers the prisoner a freely exercised op-
tion of trial by jury or by judges only. To those defendants who
elect the jury, the right remains. It is not denied to those who
choose without constraint to give it up."'' 5 Constitutional right
is not violated by an agreement to submit the issue to the court,
entered into by the free will of the accused and because he re-
garded it as advantageous so to do.
No better summation of the question has been found than the
following statement of the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia in the case of Belt v. U. S. :
We do not think that the immunity intended to be guar-
anteed by the Constitution, the right of trial by jury, should
be forced upon a person against his will, when no public
purpose is to be subserved by the restraihit, and when,
on the contrary, there is an avowed and openly expressed
public policy to be subserved by the acceptance of the
waiver. * * * However valuable may be the system of
trial by jury, and however essential its preservation may
be deemed to the perpetuation of our free institutions, it
would be the merest mockery of the freedom which it is
sought to perpetuate, if an accused person should be denied
the use of that very freedom when he desires to exercise it
in his choice of a tribunal, and the State, by its legislature,
Comm. v. Beard, 48 Super. Ct. Pa. 319, as quoted in 25 Mich. L. Rev.
695; see, also, 21 Cent. L. J. 1. c. 231.
1 S. Chesterfield Oppenheim in 25 Mich. L. Rev. 695, 702; also, State v.
Worden, eupra; Murphy v. State, 97 Ind. 579.
"4 App. D. C. 25; also, State ex rel. Warner v. Baer, supra.
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voicing the sentiment of the people, authorizes the choice.
This would be to enforce freedom by the denial of freedom.
We cannot think that this was the intention of the founders
of the Constitution, and we must therefore affirm the con-
stitutionality of the statute in question.
It is believed that the statute contemplated in the subject of
this thesis would be constitutional in this state.
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